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STRATEGIC UNDERENFORCEMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGENTINE INSURANCE REGULATION
Luke Sperduto1
The University of Chicago Law School
26 September 2016

ABSTRACT
From October 2012 to January 2016, Argentine insurance companies invested roughly 29.5
billion pesos in domestic, real economy ventures deemed "productive" by the National
Superintendent of Insurance.

They were complying with an administrative resolution,

colloquially known as Inciso K ("sub-section k"), mandating that they do so. Approximately
sixty percent of those funds went to Argentina's recently renationalized state oil and gas
company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), in the form of relatively long-term, lowyield corporate notes intended to help finance exploration and development of the massive
Vaca Muerta shale gas reserve, discovered in 2011. This scheme of financing by executive
fiat, never challenged in court, illustrates an institutional power dynamic characteristic of
Argentina's state capitalism during this period. By strategically underenforcing some
regulations, the executive branch can undermine the judiciary's ability to invalidate or
suspend other regulations as a check on executive power. Drawing from the literature on
strategic judicial decision-making, I propose a rational choice framework that delineates
some assumptions under which underenforcement enables an executive to modulate the
potency of judicial review and achieve compliance objectives that would be unattainable
under a policy of full enforcement.
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STRATEGIC UNDERENFORCEMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGENTINE INSURANCE REGULATION
We can think differently [from one another], but the law must be respected. It is one thing to have different
visions, ideas, and proposals; it is another to steamroll [public] institutions with personal projects . . . In our
government there will be no "Macrista" judges. There is neither justice nor democracy without judicial
independence, and justice must be achieved through a process cleaned of political vices. There cannot be judges
who are members of political parties. [Applause] There cannot be judges who are members of political
parties. To those who would like to be so, we say clearly: if you want to become an instrument of our
government, you are not welcome.
~ Mauricio Macri, President of Argentina, at his inauguration on December 10, 20152

I. INTRODUCTION
Power dynamics between different branches of government in a liberal constitutional
regime admit of myriad representations and logics. This Essay adopts an unadorned rational
choice institutionalism3 to explicate a logic of strategic underenforcement, whereby the
executive incompletely enforces some regulations in order to diminish the effects of the
judiciary's ability to invalidate other regulations.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Transcripción Completa del Discurso de Mauricio Macri, La Nación (10 December, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/ZH9Z-ANXM.
3 See Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence 65 (Cambridge 2011) ("Essentially, rational choice
institutionalism is the method of studying the effect of institutional structures on decision making by
postulating goals for the relevant actors and assuming that the actors pursue those goals through a
series of interactions among each other."); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in
Binder, Rhodes, and Rockman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions 23, 30 (Oxford 2006)
("The Archimedian lever of rational choice institutionalism is provided by the structure of structured
institutions. This structure embeds the logic of optimization in a strategic context."). But see Kurt
Weyland, Limits of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics, 37 Studies in
Comp Intl Dev 57, 62 (2002); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory 6
(Yale 1994) (lambasting rational choice methodologies for producing studies in which "[h]ypotheses
are formulated in empirically intractable ways; evidence is selected and tested in a biased fashion;
conclusions are drawn without serious attention to competing explanations; [and] empirical
anomalies and discordant facts are often either ignored or circumvented by way of post hoc
alterations to deductive arguments"). I neither defend nor critique rational choice institutionalism
here, and my approach surely succumbs to many of the shortcomings identified by Weyland, Green,
and Shapiro. With no pretense of empiricism, the discussion in Part III aims merely to delineate and
solve a plausible model.
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While many have noted that the power of courts depends on their legitimacy in the
eyes of the public and the willingness of other branches to respect and enforce their rulings,4
the power of courts also depends on the executive's enforcement of its own administrative
regulations, in the following way. When a regulation goes unenforced, compliance with it is
likely to be lower than it would be were the regulation enforced. This situation becomes
advantageous to the executive in the event that a second regulation is challenged in court
and invalidated on statutory, constitutional, or other grounds. While the invalidated
regulation can no longer be enforced directly, it can be enforced indirectly by an executive
that punishes noncompliance with the first, previously unenforced regulation as a means of
expressing its expectation that the invalidated regulation continue to be obeyed. In other
words, the executive enforces a valid law in a way that induces compliance with an invalid
one. This kind of indirect enforcement blunts the Judiciary's power to invalidate regulations
because it diminishes the effects of court rulings on the de facto reality of executive power
experienced by regulated firms. In consequence, it probably also reduces the likelihood that
regulations get challenged in the first place. This indirect enforcement mechanism suggests a
strategic interaction between the executive and the judiciary in which the former chooses a
level of enforcement to achieve its compliance objectives and the latter affirms or invalidates
challenged regulations so as to maximize its institutional legitimacy.
Argentina under the Kirchner administrations provides a compelling illustration of
this dynamic, for three reasons. First, in comparison to other liberal constitutional regimes,
the power of the Argentine President, both relative to other federal branches and relative to
provincial governors, is quite strong.5 "Unlike the American President," for example, "the
Argentine President has the authority to appoint her Cabinet and many other high-level
officials without approval by a legislative body."6 The Argentine President is also authorized
to discretionarily distribute a certain percentage of total tax revenues to the provinces, with
the percentage governed by an agreement between the national and provincial governments
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See, for example, Osvaldo Barreneche, Crime and the Administration of Justice in Buenos Aires, 1785–
1853, 36 (University of Nebraska Press 2006) (noting that in Argentina, "the early republican
judiciary would depend entirely on executive authorities to enforce its orders, thus deepening its
reliance on the executive branch"). See also notes ## and accompanying text.
5 See generally Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 7 J Democracy 55 (1994); Susan RoseAckerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin, Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without
Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines, 29 Berkeley J Intl L 246 (2011).
6 Rose-Ackerman et al, 29 Berkeley J Intl L at 250 (cited in note 5).
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that is rarely renegotiated.7 When it comes to potential checks on executive overreach, the
presidential impeachment process is more difficult to initiate in Argentina than it is in the
United States.8 And while President Nestor Kirchner (2003–08) placed nominal limits on
executive discretion over appointments to the Supreme Court, the General National
Prosecutor's office, the General National Defender's, and other legal offices requiring Senate
confirmation, he did so merely by decree, meaning that a later executive could remove the
limits at her or his will.9
The constitutional reform of 1994 was in part intended to check the strength of the
Argentine executive, but it did little to curb presidential discretion.10 Commentators have
pointed to slow implementation and design flaws in the reform that allowed presidents to
"repeatedly undermine[] institutional efforts to limit their power either by finding legal
loopholes or by pushing the boundaries of the law."11 The president's emergency power to
issue so-called Necessity and Urgency Decrees is a particularly egregious example.12 "In
addition to the fact that the 1994 amendment retained [this] presidential tool that is uniquely
tailored to circumvent constitutional prohibitions on lawmaking by the executive branch, the
statute regulating the procedure and scope of legislative participation was not enacted until
July 2006."13 In practice, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2008–15) "has wielded
her decree powers in ways that stretch constitutional understanding, used her control over
public spending to further partisan goals, and undermined legislated appointments'
provisions to maintain control over regulatory and monitoring bodies."14 Thus, the
institutional strength of the Argentine President, combined with the broad-based popular
support enjoyed by the Kirchners' Peronist agenda,15 meant that strategies to further
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id at 251.
Id at 253. Argentina's constitution requires a two-thirds vote by the House of Representatives to
initiate impeachment proceedings, whereas the United States requires only a simple majority in the
House.
9 Id at 300.
10 Rose-Ackerman, 29 Berkeley J Intl L at 247 (cited in note 3).
11 Id at 249.
12 See generally Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti, When the President Governs Alone: The
Decretazo in Argentina, 1989–93, in Carey and Shugart, eds, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge
1998); Druscilla L. Scribner, Limiting Presidential Power: Supreme Court-Executive Relations in Argentina and
Chile, PhD Thesis (University of California San Diego, 2004).
13 Rose-Ackerman, 29 Berkeley J Intl L at 261–62 (cited in note 3).
14 Id at 254.
15 After the sovereign-debt crisis of 2001–02, Argentina enjoyed nine years of impressive economic
growth, averaging 8.6 percent annually from 2003–07. President Nestor Kirchner and his wife
7
8
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concentrate power that might have been contained by a more antagonistic legislature or
judiciary were more likely to come to fruition.
A second characteristic of Argentine governance that renders strategic
underenforcement more likely to appear there is a deeply engrained "aspirational"
conception of law, dating from the nation's beginning. Though it achieved independence
from Spain on May 25, 1810, the Republic of Argentina had no constitution until May 1,
1853, no supreme court until 1862, no civil code until 1869, and no penal code until 1886.16
With few codified constraints and no binding precedent to guide it, legislation during this
formative period created institutions that sought to balance republican principles,
administrative logistics, and the need for social control.17 "During those years of intense
institutional experimentation [after independence], individual rights and procedural
guarantees in penal cases," for example, "were included in numerous laws, but not respected
many times."18 From 1811 to 1813, executive authority was wielded by a series of threemember bodies, known simply as Triunviratos, that unilaterally issued laws called reglamentos.19
Reacting against a reglamento of 1812 that, inter alia, replaced the colonial-era judicial
authority with an appeals court for civil and criminal cases originating in the city of Buenos
Aires, one newspaper argued that "these institutional acts should follow the constitution
rather than anticipate it; they should take our customs and practices into account rather than
trying to direct them."20 The quoted term in the first sentence of this paragraph,
"aspirational," connotes laws like the reglamento of 1812, designed to influence the
formation of customs without adequately accounting for existing customs.21 One historian of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cristina (during her first term in office) relied on this growth to increase social transfers and reduce
energy prices by subsidizing both electricity generation and consumption. The fiscal deficit and
negative trade balance in the energy sector that resulted once growth began to slow in 2010 elicited
some radical policies (discussed in the text in Part I.A), and may have contributed to the eventual
ousting of the Peronist Partida Justicialista in the 2016 presidential election. See Patricia I. Vásquez,
Argentina's Oil and Gas Sector: Coordinated Federalism and the Rule of Law, *7 (Wilson Center, 2016), online
at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/argentinasoilgas.vasquez.pdf.
16 See Barreneche, Crime at 13, 48, 54 (cited in note 4).
17 Id at 56.
18 Id.
19 See id at 11.
20 Barreneche, Crime at 55 (cited in note 4) (internal quotations omitted).
21 See also, for example, Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, The
Transplant Effect, 51 American J of Comp L 163, 189 ("Laws that are compatible with the preexisting
social norms are more likely to be well-received and thus effectuated."). Berkowitz, Pistor, and
Richard observe that Argentina adapted Spanish and French law to its own needs, proving relatively
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Argentine criminal law has observed that the agglomeration of many such laws, "even
though many were never enforced, represented the origins of a complex legal framework
[that] had the capacity to provide multiple legal answers for the same situation, depending on
the circumstances."22
As one senior partner at the nation's largest law firm explains this enduring tendency,
law in Argentina is rarely promulgated as a threshold of conduct below which sanctions
necessarily apply, as it is in the United States.23 Rather, laws are often understood as ideal
practices that will eventually be adopted as society, private enterprise, and the economy as a
whole gradually adapt to legislative intentions. Because there are fewer expectations of
immediate compliance, Argentine authorities under the Kirchner administrations could, and
often did, issue new regulations without warning, accepting that Argentine companies would
be slow to comply.24 But while well-connected locals could largely ignore, or make side
payments to evade enforcement of, overly ambitious laws, large international companies and
potential entrants to the Argentine market did not have that option.25 Due to anticorruption laws in their native jurisdictions (like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and
selective enforcement of Argentine law against them, multinational companies there bear the
full brunt of regulatory caprice. Underenforcement in this context is a natural consequence
of the historically rooted Argentine tendency to enact aspirational laws.
Finally, while it is possible that executives everywhere engage in some degree of
strategic underenforcement,26 the unabashed socialism of the Kirchner regime made the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
receptive to legal institutions transplanted from these and other colonial powers. They focus on the
period from 1862 to 1880, however, without considering earlier lawmaking by post-colonial elites
that seems to have been less deferential to local norms. Id at 194–95.
22 Barreneche, Crime at 67 (cited in note 4).
23 Personal communication with Hector Mairal, Partner at Marval O'Farrell & Mairal. March 16,
2016.
24 Id.
25 When the Prosecutor of Administrative Investigations (a position charged with investigating and
prosecuting crimes committed by officials in the public administration, by firms partially or totally
owned by the state, and by any institution or association receiving public funds) resigned in 2009, "he
said that although corruption is present everywhere in greater and lesser degrees, Argentina 'stands
out for the almost absolute impunity of this phenomenon, and for the lack of will and seriousness to
attack it.'" Rose-Ackerman, 29 Berkeley J Intl L at 301 (cited in note 3).
26 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vanderbilt L Rev 671 (2014)
(considering how the U.S. President's "exercises of executive enforcement discretion—the authority
to turn a blind eye to legal violations—may effectively reshape federal policy"); Jeffrey A. Love and
Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 Michigan L Rev 1195 (2014):
In the modern administrative state, the president’s refusal to enforce duly enacted statutes—
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government's policy priorities, and firms' options for reacting to them, more stark. So while
strategic underenforcement may or may not have been more common under the Kirchners
than in other times and places, it was certainly more visible.
The remainder of this Introduction discusses a particular Argentine insurance
regulation that exemplifies President Fernández de Kirchner's policy priorities and argues for
its evidentiary significance as a barometer of executive-judiciary relations. Part II then
surveys a subset of the mature field of scholarship on strategic judicial decision-making. Part
III adapts certain strands of that scholarship to motivate, present, and critique a model
delineating some assumptions under which underenforcement may arise out of strategic
executive-judiciary interaction. Part IV concludes.
A.

The Economic and Political Context of Argentina's Inciso K

2012 was a big year for state capitalism in Argentina. Facing drastically reduced
economic growth, declining industrial production, dwindling foreign reserves, soaring
inflation, and increasing popular unrest, President Fernández de Kirchner's administration
reacted by asserting greater control over the economy.27 On April 16th of that year, for
example, Kirchner introduced a bill to renationalize the nation's largest and oldest oil
company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), expropriating it from the Spanish multinational, Repsol, that had held a majority stake since 1999.28

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
what we call “presidential inaction”—will often dictate national policy but will receive
virtually none of Madison’s checks and balances. . . . Unchecked inaction fuels an
imbalanced political structure that endows the modern executive with more power to change
the scope of government than the Framers—or even the architects of the New Deal—ever
imagined.
See also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v Chaney, 52 U Chi L Rev 653, 674–
75 (1985) ("The fact that inaction does not appear 'coercive' is also an unpersuasive distinction;
unlawful governmental failure to act can be as harmful as unlawful action and is equally subject to
judicial review under APA standards.").
27 Hornbeck, J.F. "Argentina's Post-Crisis Economic Reform: Challenges for U.S. Policy."
Congressional Research Service. April 15, 2013: 3-15.
28 Within a month the bill was roundly approved by both chambers of the National Congress,
becoming law on May 5th and provoking an ICSID action by Repsol that led to an eventual
settlement of $5 billion in guaranteed government bonds. See Marcela Valente. "Renationalized YPF
Aims to Bring Self-Sufficiency in Oil and Gas." Inter Press Service. May 4, 2012.
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/05/renationalised-ypf-aims-to-bring-self-sufficiency-in-oil-and-gas/;
Reed, Stanley and Raphael Minder. "Repsol in $5 Billion Settlement With Argentina." The New York
Times. February 24, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/business/international/repsolsaid-to-reach-settlement-with-argentina.html?_r=0
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Then, in June and July, the National Superintendent of Insurance (SSN, after its
Spanish acronym), an agency of the executive's Ministry of Treasury and Public Finances,29
issued a series of resolutions furthering efforts to control the investment decisions of
insurers and reinsurers.30 Those resolutions—primarily barring reinsurers from retroceding
to those not locally incorporated31—built on earlier, more drastic measures forbidding
insurers from ceding risks to any reinsurer not subject to SSN's regulatory authority and
requiring insurers to repatriate all foreign investments by the end of 2011.32 These and other
similar measures decreased the diversification of insurers asset portfolios, causing the sector
as a whole to take on more risk as formerly global investment strategies were squeezed into
domestic financial markets. While international carriers were less affected, local insurers like
ACE Argentina, Chubb Argentina, Caruso and Provincia were downgraded by credit rating
agencies as a direct consequence of the SSN's resolutions.33 "According to brokers," wrote
one industry report, "local multinational insurers faced with the problem of how to cede
reinsurance to their head offices have resorted to the establishment of their own local
reinsurers, with resultant additional costs."34
In late October, Kirchner announced the National Strategic Plan for Insurance, an
ambitious set of priorities and commitments intended to guide policy until 2020.35 The
product of a year's worth of collaboration between public and private stakeholders in the
insurance industry, the plan's stated goal was to increase the industry's role in the national
economy.36 It aimed to boost insurance premiums from 2.9 percent of Argentina's gross
domestic product to five percent.37 By extending insurance coverage and channeling the
sector's considerable financial resources toward long-term investments in the real economy,
Kirchner and Superintendent of Insurance Juan Bontempo envisioned the creation of a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See http://www2.ssn.gob.ar/index.php/la-superintendencia/quienes-somos.
See Pablo S. Cereijido, Novelties in the Reinsurance Regulatory Framework, Marval O'Farrell & Mairal
(August 13, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/D7DM-MY8G.
31 Id.
32 Daniel Baron and Alex Guillamont, Argentina: Mandatory investment rules for insurers (PlaNeS).
Kennedys' Latin America E-brief. October 29, 2013.
33 "Moody's downgrades 4 Argentine Insurers citing new insurance regulations and sovereign-related
credit exposures." Global Credit Research. June 25, 2012.
34 Tony Dowding, Latin America Report 2016, Commercial Risk Europe (2016), archived at
http://www.commercialriskeurope.com/uploads/files/special-reports/SR-LatAm-Zurich-2016.pdf.
35 "A un año de la implementación del PlaNeS: Plan Nacional Estratégico del Seguro 2012-2020."
Superintendencia de Seguros de La Nación. Octubre 2013: 27-28.
36 Id.
37 Id.
29
30
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virtuous circle. That is, as infrastructure projects, local businesses and other contributors to
Argentina's real economy benefited from insurers' capital, the resulting growth in economic
activity would also stoke demand for insurance. The plan was couched as an exercise of
Kirchner's popular mandate to pursue "a model of State-guided economic growth through
social inclusion and public investment."38
The crux of it was Resolution 37163/2012, issued by the SSN, which added another
set of requirements to the law governing insurers' investments.39 Those requirements,
colloquially referred to as Inciso K ("sub-section k"), told insurers to place a specified
percentage of their total investments in certain real economy ventures pre-approved by the
SSN.40 The required percentage varied depending on the insurer's line of business. Those
with higher claim turnover requiring greater liquidity, like workers compensation, were not
required to contribute as much as life and retirement insurers, whose obligations to
policyholders can be more reliably smoothed over longer time horizons. At the time Inciso
K was first enacted, in October 2012, the former had to contribute five percent of their total
assets under management, while the latter had to cough up twelve percent.41 By September
2014, these minimums had increased to eight and eighteen percent, respectively.42 When
Argentina's new president, Mauricio Macri, finally repealed Inciso K on January 16, 2016, the
measure had co-opted a total of 29.5 billion pesos from the insurance industry.43 The SSN
resolution executing the repeal rendered future investments in Inciso K vehicles "optional"
and laid out a divestment timeline stretching into 2017 to avoid capital flight. The January
resolution left on the books a modest reminder of Kirchner's intervention: Inciso L,
obligating insurers to keep 3% of their assets invested in SMEs.44
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id.
Specifically, it added sub-section k to section 35.8.1 of SSN Resolution 21523/92, a complement
to Law 20091, the main body of insurance law in Argentina. The ensuing explanation in the text
follows Baron and Guillamont (cited in note 20).
38
39

Resolución 37163/2012, Boletín Oficial (October 22, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/PY6QWWZA.
41 Id.!
42 "Inciso K: Las Aseguradoras Invirtieron 10.903 Pesos En La Economía Real." Superintendencia de
Seguros de la Nación. February 13, 2014.
43!Gabriel Wolf. "Informe sobre la Política de Canalización de Recursos del sector Seguros hacia la
Economía real (INCISO K) y su “Modificación” por el Gobierno de Macri." Economia Politica para la
Argentina. February 2, 2016.!
44 Id.
40
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Inciso K was a mechanism for reorienting institutional investment away from shortterm financial instruments and towards the kind of economic activity that the government
wanted to promote. To achieve this reorientation, the SSN created a hierarchy of
committees to vet investment opportunities for approval as worthy recipients of Inciso K
funds.45 The "Eligibility Committee of Investments for Insurance and Reinsurance
Companies," including representatives from the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry
of Industry, would grant or deny final approval after a subordinate committee had found the
investments satisfactory according to the following three minimal criteria. First, the recipient
investment vehicle must finance productive projects (i.e., it must focus on the development
of infrastructure, enterprise or industry). Second, corporate notes, mutual funds, financial
trusts and other securities must be authorized by the National Commission of Values
(similar to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Third, funds obtained through
Inciso K must be demonstrably allocated toward their pre-specified destination and use (i.e.,
no general purpose fundraising allowed).46
Once approved, an investment vehicle would be announced by the SSN and added
to the list of "productive investments" posted on its website.47 Throughout the three years
during which Inciso K was enforced, a total of 96 investment opportunities were approved,
including corporate notes, financial trusts, mutual funds targeting infrastructure and mutual
funds targeting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across a range of economic
sectors.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cereijido, Pablo S. "The Authorities Defined Which Investments by Insurers Qualify as
Investments in the “Real Economy”." Marval O'Farrell & Mairal. December 21, 2012.
http://www.marval.com.ar/publicacion/?id=5952.
46 Id.
47 See Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, Inversiones Productivas - Inciso K, online at
http://www2.ssn.gob.ar/index.php/companias-y-productores/inversiones-productivas-inciso-k.
45
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Figure 1. Sectors Receiving Inciso K Financing (in millions of Argentine pesos)48

It is beyond doubt that the composition of that list of productive investments was
influenced by more than a prudential concern for economic productivity and social
inclusion. Consider that the first corporate notes approved to receive Inciso K funding were
issued by YPF, less than seven months after it was nationalized.49 The national oil and gas
giant was approved for ten Inciso K issuances over the course of three years, more than any
other company or fund, and ultimately received roughly 60% of all Inciso K financing.50
YPF offered a total of over 17 billion Argentine pesos in notes, with an average maturity
more than twice that of its non-Inciso K issuances over the same period.51 The decreeinduced demand also lowered the interest rates YPF paid on notes issued through Inciso K,
which were as much as four percentage points lower than those paid on otherwise

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"Inciso K: Las Aseguradoras Invirtieron 10.903 Pesos En La Economía Real." Superintendencia de
Seguros de la Nación. February 13, 2014. http://www2.ssn.gob.ar/index.php/novedades/item/41inciso-k-aumentan-los-minimos-para-invertir-en-proyectos-productivos
49 See Communicación SSN 3404 (December 14, 2012), online at
http://www2.ssn.gob.ar/index.php/companias-y-productores/inversiones-productivas-inciso-k.
50 Gabriel Wolf. "Informe sobre la Política de Canalización de Recursos del sector Seguros hacia la
Economía real (INCISO K) y su “Modificación” por el Gobierno de Macri." Economia Politica para la
Argentina. February 2, 2016.!
51 Author's computation, based on auction results archived by Mercado Abierto Electronico, an
Argentine securities and foreign currency exchange. See
http://www.mae.com.ar/mercados/mpmae/historico_mpmae.aspx.
48
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comparable non-Inciso K issuances.52 While other oil and gas companies qualified for Inciso
K, none of the provincially-owned oil companies did.53
In addition to its advertised aim of economic growth through social inclusion and
public investment, Inciso K played a vital role in a coordinated effort by the Kirchner
administration to reverse a negative trade balance in the energy sector that was depleting
foreign reserves and weakening domestic production. Specifically, it bolstered YPF's
finances during the 2013 negotiations with Chevron that ripened into a 1.5 billion USD joint
venture to develop the Vaca Muerta shale formation54—a massive reserve stretching across
four of Argentina's southern provinces.55 YPF's subsidized financial strength not only
facilitated drilling, it also served as a signal. In combination with a timely decision by the
Supreme Court of Argentina56 and an even more timely executive decree explicitly tailored to
incentivize investment in hydrocarbon production,57 it signaled to Chevron, and to other oil
companies who were rightfully wary of the unstable macroeconomic climate and political
risk, that Kirchner could not have been more serious about attracting capital to the Vaca
Muerta.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Measured as a spread against the BADLAR interest rate, used by the Central Bank of Argentina for
many calculations. See Gabriel Wolf. "Informe sobre la Política de Canalización de Recursos del
sector Seguros hacia la Economía real (INCISO K) y su “Modificación” por el Gobierno de Macri."
Economia Politica para la Argentina. February 2, 2016.
53 See Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, Inversiones Productivas - Inciso K, online at
http://www2.ssn.gob.ar/index.php/companias-y-productores/inversiones-productivas-inciso-k. See
also
54 Daniel Gilbert and Taos Turner, Chevron, YPF Sign $1.5 Billion Shale-Oil Deal, The Wall Street Joural
(July 16, 2013), online at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324348504578610322993362936.
55 Patricia I. Vasquez, Argentina's Oil and Gas Sector: Coordinated Federalism and the Rule of Law *11
(Wilson Center, 2016), online at
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/argentinasoilgas.vasquez.pdf.
56 Augustino Fontevecchia, Chevron's Argentine Shale Dream: Supreme Court Decision Paves Way For YPF
Deal To Develop Vaca Muerta (June 5, 2013), online at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/06/05/chevrons-argentine-shale-dreamsupreme-court-decision-paves-way-for-ypf-deal-to-develop-vaca-muerta/#7e8cb9991317.
57Decreto 929/2013: Créase el Régimen de Promoción de Inversión para la Explotación de
Hidrocarburos, Boletín Oficial (June 11, 2013), online at
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/215000-219999/217314/norma.htm.
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B.

The Evidentiary Significance of Inciso K

Interesting as it may be in its own right, the saga of Inciso K also hints at a neglected
dynamic in the balance of power between the executive branch and the judiciary. Namely, by
underenforcing its own regulations, a strong executive can undermine the institutional
legitimacy, and power, of the judiciary. In the context of Argentine insurance regulation, the
judiciary's undermined legitimacy is evidenced by the fact that neither Inciso K, nor any of
the investment regulations preceding it in the summer of 2012, was ever challenged in
court.58
One might think that a multi-billion dollar insurance industry would be able to
mount a legal challenge against a string of regulations that jeopardized the security of its
investments, raised borrowing costs, and cut into its bottom line.59 The absence of such a
challenge by an otherwise legally sophisticated industry suggests that insurers did not expect
the benefits of judicial involvement to outweigh the costs. This would have been the case if:
(a) insurers did not expect courts60 to rule in their favor; or, (b) even a favorable ruling could
not have been expected to guarantee a relief from the regulatory burden that was substantial
enough to outweigh the costs of having baldly challenged the authority of the SSN. In either
case, Kirchner's policies remained in force due partially to the relatively low expected value
of judicial intervention as perceived by regulated firms.
Another reason it makes sense to posit the absence of a legal challenge to Inciso K as
the relevant explicandum is that, in fact, insurers did challenge a similarly restrictive
regulation in 2000, and they won!61 Well, they sort of won. Resolution 27220/1999, issued by
the SSN in December of 1999, stipulated a formula that set an upper limit on the surrender
fees that insurers could charge policyholders who cancelled their policy, or withdrew cash

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See APPENDIX B: Challenges to SSN Resolutions.
See notes 21–23, 29 and accompanying text.
60 Depending on the character of the resolution and the corporate status of the plaintiff, resolutions
issued by the SSN can be challenged in the Court of Appeals for Administrative Matters or in the
Court of Appeals for Commercial Matters, rulings by each of which can be appealed to the Supreme
Court under appropriate circumstances. See Ley 20091: Ley de Entidades de Seguro y Su Control,
Art. 83, Boletín Oficial (Feb 7, 1973), archived at https://perma.cc/4TBC-D88R. See also
APPENDIX B: Challenges to SSN Resolutions.
61 See Eagle Star (International Life) Ltd. v Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, La Ley 2000-F, 837,
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V (July 14, 2000).
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from their annuity account, prematurely.62 In protest against government interference with
such a critical contractual term,63 Eagle Star Limited (a life insurer then operating in
Argentina as part of the Zurich Financial Services Group) petitioned to have the resolution
suspended.64 Recognizing that Resolution 27220/1999 overstepped even the SSN's
expansive statutory authorization to "ensure that contractual conditions [in insurance
policies] are equitable,"65—and acknowledging its own authority "to neutralize the effects of
a resolution that had created a damaging situation,"—the Court of Appeals in Administrative
Matters provisionally suspended the Resolution as it pertained to Eagle Star.66
It is almost impossible to assess the value of this qualified legal victory for insurers.
At least in the recollection of one senior partner in the insurance practice group of a large,
Argentine law firm, the ruling had very little impact.67 Apparently, no other insurer sought a
similar injunction and Eagle Star did not press its case in another court that could have
rendered the suspension permanent and general, rather than merely provisional and ad hoc.68
And it is unknown whether Eagle Star acted on the ruling by raising its surrender fees above
the cap stipulated by Resolution 27220/1999.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, Resolución 27.220/99: Reglamentación de las quitas por
rescate máximas a aplicar en el calculo de los valores garantizados, 21 Boletín Oficial (Dec 9, 1999), online at
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/61605/norma.htm.
63 In a typical insurance contract, policyholders are given the option of terminating—that is,
surrendering—the policy early and collecting its accumulated cash value in exchange for a surrender
fee that decreases over the term of the policy. Especially for large insurers, the inability to raise
surrender fees inhibits efforts to estimate and reduce fluctuations in their policy reserves driven by
policyholders opting to surrender their policies early. Moreover, capped surrender fees make an
insurer's cash flow more sensitive to rising interest rates, as policyholders are more likely to abandon
their contracts for higher returns elsewhere. See Chenghsien Tsai, Weiyu Kuo, and Wei-Kuang Chen,
Early Surrender and the Distribution of Policy Reserves, 31 Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 429, 430
(2002).
64 See Eagle Star (International Life) Ltd. v Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, La Ley 2000-F, 837,
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V (July 14, 2000).
65 Art. 25, Ley 20.091, Ley de Entidades de Seguros y su Control, Boletín Oficial (Feb 7, 1973), online at
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/20000-24999/20965/norma.htm.
66 Eagle Star (International Life) Ltd. v Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, La Ley 2000-F, 837, Cámara
Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V (July 14, 2000) ("En
consecuencia, concédese la medida cautelar solicitada por la actora y suspéndase lo efectos de la
resolución N° 27.220/99 de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación con relacion a la actora con
carácter provisorio.").
67 Personal communication with Pablo Cereijido, Partner in the Insurance Practice Group at Marval
O'Farrell & Mairal. March 16, 2016.
68 Eagle Star (International Life) Ltd. v Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, La Ley 2000-F, 837, Cámara
Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V (July 14, 2000).
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What is observable is that in 2000, a restrictive SSN resolution was challenged in
court and (at least provisionally) suspended, while from 2012 to 2016, another set of SSN
resolutions, equally if not more restrictive for insurers, went unchallenged. Many scholars
have identified positive correlations between GDP growth (along with other measures of
socioeconomic development) and litigation across a range of political and economic
contexts, suggesting that individuals and firms are more likely to press their claims in court
when the economy—and, by implication, their income—is growing.69 As Figure 2 illustrates,
however, this relationship is unlikely to fully explain the reduced volume of legal challenges
mounted against SSN resolutions during Cristina Kirchner's presidency. For six out of the
eight years of her administration, the number of lawsuits challenging a resolution issued by
the SSN was less than would be expected given the rate of GDP growth that year. Nor can
the reduced volume of legal challenges be attributed to a reduced number of resolutions
issued by the SSN. As Figure 3 depicts, the SSN issued more resolutions in the first year of
Cristina Kirchner's administration than it did in the first years of Carlos Menem's (1989–99)
and Nestor Kirchner's combined. While those earlier administrations ramped up the number
of SSN resolutions issued during the later years of their terms, Cristina Kirchner's
administration was unique in issuing more resolutions at the beginning than that the end of
her time in office. Having so many regulations on the books early in her term would have
afforded her more enforcement discretion and greater leverage over insurers who might
otherwise have been more willing to challenge her policies in court.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 See generally, for example, Sital Kalantry, Theodore Eisenberg, and Nick Robinson, Litigation as a
Measure of Well-Being, 62 DePaul L Rev 247 (2013) (India); Tom Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker, The
Unrelectant Litigant?, 35 J Legal Stud 31 (2006) (Japan); Lance Bachmeier, Patrick Gaughan, and
Norman R. Swanson, The Volume of Federal Litigation and the Macroeconomy, 24 Intl Rev L Econ 191
(2004) (U.S.A.); Gerhard Clemenz and Claus Gugler, Macroeconomic Development and Civil Litigation, 9
European J L Econ 215 (2000) (Austria); David S. Clark, Civil Litigation Trends in Europe and Latin
America Since 1945, 24 L and Soc'y Rev 549 (1990) (comparing regions within Italy, Spain, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru).
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Figure 2. SSN Resolutions Challenged in Court, 1989–2015 70
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Data on the number of lawsuits challenging SSN regulations in a given year were compiled by
searching the Información Legal database, managed by Thomson Reuters, as described in APPENDIX
B: Challenges to SSN Resolutions. Data on annual GDP growth were compiled from World Bank
national accounts, available online at http://data.worldbank.org/country/argentina. At the time of
writing, GDP growth for 2015 was still a projection, estimated to be about 2.1 percent. The green
line is a line of best fit, given by a linear regression of number of lawsuits on GDP growth. In this
basic specification of the relationship, the coefficient on GDP growth is not statistically significant,
even at the 10% level. Nonetheless, the green line still provides a rough approximation of the
number of lawsuits that would be expected based on the rate of GDP growth in a given year. Years
followed by "(CM)" are those in which Carlos Menem was the President for most of the year, while
years followed by "(NK)" correspond to the presidency of Nestor Kirchner.
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Figure 3. SSN Resolutions Issued Over the Course of Three Presidencies 71
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Thus, abstracting from any details about the resolutions themselves that may have
made 27220/1999 more worth challenging than Inciso K, the remainder of this Essay posits,
as a partial explanation for the foregoing observations, a rational choice scenario in which
underenforcement of executive regulations reduces the expected value of judicial
intervention, making firms less likely to challenge regulations in court.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
While a centralized, executive authority in any kind of regime may benefit from the
conflict resolution and social control achieved by a seemingly independent judiciary, these
benefits necessarily come at the cost of ceding lawmaking power to judges and courts.
"When this inevitable phenomenon is encountered," Professor Martin Shapiro explains,
"both autocratic and constitutional regimes of centralized political authority can respond in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Data on the number of SSN resolutions issued in a given year were compiled from the archives of
the Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina, where the government publishes all legislation and
regulations, searchable online at https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/#!buscadorAvanzado. The
number of resolutions issued in a given year is only a rough proxy for the change in the number of
regulatory provisions in force, because it does not account for: (i) variation in the number of
regulatory provisions per resolution; (ii) variation in the number of firms affected by any given
resolution; (iii) resolutions that amend or repeal the regulatory provisions of earlier resolutions; or
(iv) regulatory provisions that are rendered invalid by court rulings, congressional legislation, or other
executive lawmaking. Much more investigation would be required to isolate changes in the number
of regulatory provisions in force with any empirically worthwhile precision.
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one of four ways."72 First, the executive can yield, willingly sharing power with the judiciary.
Second, the executive "can systematically withdraw from the legally defined competence of
the judiciary all matters of political interest."73 Third, it can intervene on an ad hoc basis "to
pull particular cases out of the courts."74 And fourth, the executive "can create systems of
judicial recruitment, training, organization, and promotion that" conduce to judicial
neutrality between private parties but judicial deference to the regime "on all legal matters
touching its interests."75 The purpose of this Essay is to point out that, under certain
circumstances, underenforcement of its own regulations is a fifth response available to an
executive reacting against the judiciary's exercise of political power. Strategically
underenforcing can empower the executive to indirectly enforce regulations suspended or
invalidated by the judiciary, thereby undermining the judiciary's ability to check executive
power.
Conventional accounts of the judicial independence achieved by a constitutional
separation of powers76 trace the notion from Aristotle to Locke and Montesquieu to
Madison and Hamilton, who famously wrote of the judiciary that it has "neither FORCE NOR
WILL

but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend on the aid of the executive arm even

for the efficacy of its judgments."77 But whereas Hamilton emphasized this dependence in
support of his argument that an "independent spirit in the judges" requires "the permanent
tenure of judicial offices,"78 contemporary scholars have seized on it as a partial determinant
of judicial decision-making. Moreover, they have further elaborated a conception of
"dependence" that encompasses strategic interaction between the judiciary and both elected
branches,79 and they have recognized that such interaction is thoroughly inflected by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis 32 (Chicago 1981).
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Mathew E. Glassman, Separation of Powers: An Overview 3–7 (Congressional Research Service
2016); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems
108, 108–17 (1970).
77 The Federalist, 78.
78 The Federalisti, 78.
79 See Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 Annual Rev Law Soc
Sci 341, 351 (2010) ("The basic idea is that for judges to render efficacious decisions—those that
other actors will respect and with which they will comply—the judge must attend to the preferences
and likely actions of members of the elected branches who could override or otherwise thwart their
decisions.").
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perceptions of the judiciary's "institutional legitimacy."80 Professor Tom Clark, for example,
has reiterated the scholarly consensus that "legitimacy is key to the Court's institutional
capacity—without a positive perception as a legitimate and prestigious institution, the court
cannot be an efficacious branch of the government."81
In the Argentine context, Professor Gretchen Helmke has published extensively on
the logic of, and empirical support for, strategic defection by judges.82 Drawing on several
decades of data on Argentine law and politics, she finds that "when judges believe that they
are constrained by incoming governments who oppose the incumbent government, their
best response may be not to support the current government, but rather to rule against it."83
Regarding executive branch responses to strategic judicial decision-making, Professors Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin "demonstrate how strategic
Presidents in [Argentina and the Philippines] were able to undermine most of the
constitutional attempts to control unilateral executive action."84
III. MODELING STRATEGIC UNDERENFORCEMENT
Consider five regulatory provisions, A through E, each requiring of regulated firms a
distinct form of costly compliance. The regulator that promulgated them ensures compliance
with the provisions by enforcement—that is, by punishing noncompliance. Assume that
compliance generates some revenue for the government and increases with the level of
enforcement.85 But if a provision, A, is challenged in court and invalidated by judicial order,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
James L. Gibson, Judicial Institutions, in Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman, eds, The Oxford Handbook on
Political Institutions, 514, 524 (2006).
80
81

Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence 66 (Cambridge 2011).

See Gretchen Helmke, The logic of strategic defection: Judicial decision-making in Argentina
under dictatorship and democracy, 96 American Pol Sci Rev 291 (2002); Courts Under Constraints:
Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina (Cambridge 2005).
83 Gretchen Helmke, Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina 28 (Cambridge
2005). But see Laarni Escresa and Nuno Garoupa, Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the
Philippine Supreme Court—An Empirical Analysis (1986-2010), 21 Asian J Pol Science 189 (2013).
84 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin, Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of
Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines, 29 Berkeley J Intl L 246, 247 (2011).
See also Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi, Judicial independence in unstable environments, Argentina 1935-1998, 46
American Journal of Political Science 699 (2002); Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, The Politics
of Institutional Weakness: Argentine Democracy (Pennsylvania State University 2005).
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the regulator can no longer punish firms for not complying with it. At least not directly.
Indirectly, however, it may still be feasible and worthwhile for the regulator to punish firms for
noncompliance with A by enforcing other, still-valid provisions more rigorously. When
combined with winks, nods, threats, and other not-so-subtle signals from the regulator,86
intensified enforcement of a valid provision, in response to noncompliance with A, may
induce a degree of compliance with A, court order notwithstanding.
Indirect enforcement of this variety will be more feasible when the regulator is not
enforcing all provisions completely. This is because indirect enforcement of an invalidated
provision only works when firms are incompletely compliant with a valid provision; it is that
margin of noncompliance with a valid provision that lends a semblance of legitimacy to the
regulator's indirect enforcement action. For example, if, before A was invalidated, the
regulator was completely enforcing all five provisions, compliance with B, C, D, and E will
be high, and it will be more difficult for the regulator to intensify enforcement efforts
enough to identify and punish instances of noncompliance with those still-valid provisions.
On the other hand, if it had only been enforcing A, B, C, and D, then compliance with E
will be lower than it would have been had E been enforced, so there will be more
noncompliance with E for the regulator to punish as a means of indirectly enforcing A.
Further, had the regulator only been enforcing A, B, and C, then both D and E will be
available as instruments of indirectly enforcing A. Eventually, however, if too few
provisions are directly enforced, compliance may drop to the point at which the ability to
indirectly enforce is no longer valuable to the regulator, either because it is easier to increase
compliance by increasing direct enforcement or because fewer provisions are being
challenged in court. By choosing a level of direct enforcement, the regulator can calibrate its
ability to indirectly enforce in accordance with anticipated economic, political, and judicial
reactions to its regulations.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 This kind of signaling is by no means a uniquely Argentine phenomenon. See Community–Service
Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc v FCC, 593 F2d 1102, 1116 (D.C.Cir.1978) (en banc) ("A regulatory
agency may be able to put pressure upon a regulated firm in a number of ways, some more subtle
than others."); Writers Guild of America v American Broadcasting Co, Inc, 609 F2d 355, 365–66 (9th
Cir.1979) (“[T]he line between permissible regulatory activity and impermissible ‘raised eyebrow’
harassment of vulnerable licensees is . . . exceedingly vague.”). See generally Tim Wu, Agency Threats,
60 Duke L J 1841 (2011).

!

Sperduto 21

Whether it is worthwhile for a regulator to strategically underenforce in order to be
able to indirectly enforce invalidated provisions depends on a variety of factors. First and
foremost, what is the regulator's overarching objective? Is it to achieve the maximum rate of
compliance with all provisions as soon as possible, given its limited resources? Or is it to
achieve the highest possible average rate of compliance with a particular provision over the
next decade, by whatever means necessary? From an a priori perspective, strategic
underenforcement would seem more valuable to the regulator concerned to reduce variation
in the rate of compliance with particular provisions, generating predictably reliable streams
of revenue over the long term. Moreover, depending on how enforcement costs and
compliance revenues vary across provisions, a regulator may be able to underenforce those
provisions that are most costly to enforce, preserving a capacity to indirectly enforce the
highest revenue-generating provisions if necessary.
A second set of factors that intuitively affects the value of strategic
underenforcement relates to how the regulator's objectives align with those of the judiciary.87
If the judiciary is highly unlikely to invalidate a regulatory provision, or if the provision is
highly unlikely to be challenged in court in the first place, then there is little advantage to be
gained by underenforcing. On the other hand, if the judiciary appears highly likely to
invalidate a provision of importance to the executive, then it may be worthwhile for the
regulator to underenforce other provisions, in order to preserve indirect enforcement as a
backup enforcement mechanism.
Building on these considerations, the following three Sections employ a series of
algebraic equations and corresponding graphs to represent and discuss (a) some relationships
between the level of enforcement, the rate of compliance, and the likelihood of judicial
invalidation of regulatory provisions; (b) the objectives of the Executive and the Judiciary;
and (c) some behaviors that might be observed if the Executive and the Judiciary
strategically pursue those objectives within the context of the relationships set out in (a). The
final Section discusses the model in the context of Inciso K and critiques the model by
highlighting its limitations. Throughout, I will make a series of simplifying assumptions that
reduce the verisimilitude of the model for the sake of analytical tractability and clarity of
exposition.88
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Similar effects, not considered, here, might be expected from legislative interference as well.
Some assumptions are explicitly stated as such or flagged in footnotes; countless others are not.
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A.

The Mechanics of Indirect Enforcement

Consider the rate of compliance—that is, the number of firms compliant with a
given regulatory provision divided by the total number of firms regulated by it—as a
dependent variable. Let C denote the average rate of compliance across all promulgated
provisions. To establish the dependence of C on the behavior of an Executive that
promulgates and enforces provisions and a Judiciary with authority to review them when
they are challenged in court, this Section builds toward the indirect enforcement dynamic in
three steps. First, how would compliance depend on enforcement in the absence of the
Judiciary? Second, how does compliance depend on direct enforcement with the possibility
of judicial review? And third, how does compliance depend on indirect enforcement with
the possibility of judicial review? The independent variables are the level of enforcement by
the Executive and the likelihood that the Judiciary affirms the validity of a challenged
provision. The level of enforcement, x, denotes the share of noncompliance that is
punished, such that x = 1 corresponds to full enforcement and x = 0 corresponds to no
enforcement. Note immediately that x can be reduced by decreasing enforcement of existing
provisions, by issuing more regulatory provisions without a corresponding increase in
enforcement, or by any combination of these two mechanisms. λ denotes the likelihood, as
estimated by firms, that the Judiciary will affirm a challenged provision, and is assumed not
to vary across provisions.89
In the absence of judicial review (or in a world where the Judiciary always affirms the
validity of challenged provisions), the relationship between the level of enforcement (x) and
the average rate of compliance (C) is intuitively given by a logistic, S-shaped function. At
low levels of enforcement each additional increase in enforcement generates more new
compliance than the last, while at high levels of enforcement each additional increase in
enforcement generates less new compliance than the last. The parameters of this function
(namely, the slope of its ascent and the level of enforcement corresponding to its inflection
point) are given by firm calculations that are exogenous to the model. This relationship is
represented by the red line in Figure 4.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This assumption could be relaxed to reflect attitudinal or legalistic accounts of judicial behavior, by
letting λ vary with judges' ideological preferences or with the extremism of the challenged provision.
Incorporating these sources of variation, though potentially important for a more refined
characterization of indirect enforcement, is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
89
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Figure 4. Logistic Compliance

For the sake of analytical tractability, however, the ensuing discussion reduces the logistic
relationship to a linear one, such that each additional increase in enforcement generates the
same, one-for-one increase in compliance, as represented by the red line in Figure 2.
Figure 5. Linear Compliance

When there is a possibility that a provision challenged in court might be invalidated,
firms reduce their compliance in proportion to their expectations of the likelihood that this
will occur. Firms' expectations of judicial behavior are the only source of uncertainty
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endogenous to the model. Thus, whether or not a provision is challenged in court is dictated
by exogenous firm calculations. If it is challenged and invalidated, compliance with it will be
zero. If it is challenged and affirmed, compliance with it will be x, per Figure 5.
Consequently, the expected average rate of compliance (CE) with an unchallenged provision
is a simple weighted average of compliance-with-provisions-expected-to-be-affirmed (CA)
and compliance-with-provisions-expected-to-be-invalidated (CI), with the weights given by
firms' estimates of the likelihood of each outcome. In other words:
(i)

CE = λCA + ( 1 – λ ) CI
= λx + ( 1 – λ ) * 0 = λx .

When firms expect that the Judiciary is highly likely to affirm challenged provisions (λ =
0.8), CE is high, as represented by the solid line in Figure 6. When firms expect a high
likelihood that challenged provisions will be invalidated (λ = 0.2), and thus unenforceable
under a regime of purely direct enforcement, CE is low, as represented by the dashed line in
Figure 6.
Figure 6. Compliance Under Direct Enforcement with Judicial Review

With the weighted average of equation (i) in mind, consider what happens when the
Executive implements an indirect enforcement regime. Under such a regime, invalidated
provisions can be enforced by punishing noncompliance with valid provisions. As before,
compliance-with-provisions-expected-to-be-affirmed (CA) is given by x, per Figure 5. But
now, compliance-with-provisions-expected-to-be-invalidated (CI) depends on the level of
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indirect enforcement, which itself depends on the rate of compliance and the level of direct
enforcement in the following way. Indirect enforcement, by definition, requires direct
enforcement (x) of an unchallenged or affirmed provision with which firms are
noncompliant. The extent of such noncompliance is given by 1 – CA. Therefore, for a given
level of direct enforcement, the executive has x * (1 – CA), or x – x2, opportunities for
indirect enforcement. For the provisions that are widely-understood to be most important to
the Executive, the Executive fully avails itself of, and firms fully respond to, these indirect
enforcement opportunities. In consequence, CI = x – x2 (represented by the blue line in
Figure 7), and the weighted average of equation (i) becomes:
(ii)

CE = λx + ( 1 – λ )( x –"x2 ) .

So in a regime of indirect enforcement when λ = 0.8 (or alternatively, 0.2), the expected
average rate of compliance will depend on the level of direct enforcement as depicted by the
solid (or, in the event that λ = 0.2, dashed) green line in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Compliance Under Indirect Enforcement
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Many of the most significant assumptions undergirding the conceptual coherence of
these postulated relationships between enforcement, compliance, and judicial review regard
the uniformity of the regulatory provisions at issue. As represented in the model, provisions
do vary from one another in terms of the costs they impose on compliant firms. Nor do they
vary in terms of the revenue they generate for the government or in terms of the costs of
enforcing them. These three assumed invariances together justify the proposition that the
Executive can and will indirectly enforce any invalidated provision by punishing
noncompliance with any valid one. In reality, the costs and benefits of indirect enforcement
will vary widely across provisions. Moreover, as mentioned in the concluding sentence of
the first paragraph of this Section, firms' expectations of whether a challenged provision will
be affirmed or invalidated are assumed to be invariant across provisions. This assumed
invariance reduces the entire gamut of sophisticated legal reasoning by judges and corporate
counsels to a single random variable, λ. While this reduction deprives the model of the
power to differentiate reactions to blatant executive overreach from reactions to potentially
prudent regulatory initiatives, it also helps illuminate more clearly the mechanics of indirect
enforcement. To isolate the logic of those mechanics, regulatory provisions are assumed to
be perfect substitutes for one another.
B.

The Objectives of the Executive and the Judiciary

If the relationships represented in equation (ii) and Figure 7 are taken as the rules or
structure of the institutional setting in which the Executive and the Judiciary interact,90 "[t]he
[next] step in developing a rational choice model of institutional interactions is to establish
the goals of each actor."91 In other words, what preferences motivate the Executive's choice
of x and the Judiciary's efforts to influence λ?
The Executive is assumed to care about two things: the expected average rate of
compliance (CE) and the variance in the average rate of compliance (CVAR). It prefers the
former to be high and the latter to be low, with the relative strength of these preferences
determined by the time horizon of its enforcement priorities. If it needs a lot of revenue very
quickly, without much regard for the long-term effects on compliance, then the Executive's
preference for a high CE trumps its preference for a low CVAR. On the other hand, if it cares
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See Epstein and Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics at 626 (cited in note #).
Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence 65 (Cambridge 2011).
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more about a dependably steady stream of revenue persisting into the future, then it may
gladly accept a slightly lower CE in order to achieve a reduction in CVAR. While a change in
CVAR does not, all else equal, affect CE, it does affect the reliability of the Executive's
estimate of what CE will be at some future date. The more compliance varies with firms'
expectations of judicial behavior, the less confidence the Executive can place in its estimates
of future CE. Therefore, an Executive that highly values the reliability of its estimates of
future compliance-generated revenue may prefer that the Judiciary send very clear signals to
firms about how it will rule, even if that clarity comes at the cost of slightly reduced
compliance in the present. Thus, the Executive's objective function can be represented as:
(iii)

UExec = γ1CE – γ2CVAR ;

where γ1 and γ2 are parameters, summing to one, that denote the relative strength of the
Executive's preferences for a high but uniform rate of compliance.
The Judiciary is assumed to care about two sources of legitimacy: its good standing
with the Executive and its good standing among firms. Its reputation with each audience is
determined by the impact of its decisions on that audience. Insofar as it cares about its
reputation with the Executive, the Judiciary aims to maximize CE, generating revenue for the
government. At the same time, the Judiciary's reputation among firms will decrease as CE
increases (because compliance is costly for firms) and will increase as CVAR increases. This is
because large variations in the rate of compliance mean that judicial decisions have large
impacts for firms. In contrast, if compliance does not vary much with changes in λ, it means
that whether firms expect the Judiciary to invalidate or affirm a provision has little affect on
their behavior. In other words, firms respect the Judiciary to the extent of its perceived
ability to impact their compliance behavior. Thus, the Judiciary's reputational objective
function can be represented as:
(iv)

RJud = β1CE + β2( CVAR – CE ) ;

where β1 and β2 are parameters, summing to one, that indicate how much the Judiciary cares
about its reputation with the Executive versus its reputation among firms.
C.

Optimal Strategies

In equilibrium, the Executive will choose a level of enforcement (x) that maximizes
its objective function, knowing that the Judiciary will choose λ (by ruling in ways that create
its desired expectations among firms) so as to maximize its reputation. Both actors are
assumed to know the form of the other's objective function, but not the values of
!
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parameters γ1, γ2, β1, and β2. This assumption implies four classes of equilibria, depicted in
Figure 8, distinguished by the relative sizes of these parameters.
The red lines in each graph in Figure 8 intersect at the point representing an optimal
outcome from which neither the Executive nor the Judiciary has any incentive to deviate,
given the other's expected response, under a regime of direct enforcement.92 The intersection
of the blue lines represents that equilibrium under a regime of indirect enforcement.93
Comparing changes in the values of x and λ as the enforcement regime changes from direct
to indirect (i.e. moves from the red intersection to the blue intersection), some intuitive
results emerge. Preliminarily, relative to a regime of direct enforcement, the Executive always
chooses to enforce less under a regime of indirect enforcement. This reduced level of
enforcement has nothing to do with enforcement costs. As suggested initially in the
Introduction and again at the outset to Part III, indirect enforcement is more valuable when
some provisions are underenforced. Secondly, when the Judiciary cares more about its
reputation among firms than its reputation with the Executive (as in the pair of graphs on
the right), a switch from direct to indirect enforcement makes the Judiciary less likely to
affirm challenged provisions. This can be understood as the Judiciary's response to the loss
of variation in compliance (CVAR) occasioned by the reduction in enforcement. If it cannot
earn the respect of firms by effecting large changes in their behavior through its rulings, the
Judiciary is more likely to earn their respect by ruling to invalidate challenged provisions and
reduce compliance.
Finally, observe that when the Judiciary cares more about its reputation with the
Executive than its reputation among firms (as in the pair of graphs on the left), the
Executive can achieve a greater likelihood that its provisions will be affirmed in court by
reducing the level of enforcement. This effect will be more pronounced, and more valuable
to the Executive, the more the Executive cares about reducing variation in the rate of
compliance rather than maximizing the expected value of compliance. This suggests that
strategic underenforcement is more effective as a long-term strategy, when it can be
combined with other efforts to augment judicial allegiance to the Executive.
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Figure 8. Equilibria in xλ-Space Under Direct (Red) and Indirect (Blue) Enforcement Regimes
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D.

Discussion and Shortcomings of the Model

In the context of Inciso K, it may well have been the case that the large volume of
SSN resolutions issued at the beginning of President Cristina Kirchner's administration
reduced the level of enforcement to the point where the SSN could punish noncompliance
with some provisions by enforcing others. It should be noted that while this Essay has
emphasized the possibility of indirectly enforcing judicially invalidated provisions, similar
indirect enforcement practices may benefit a regulator that simply wants to use easy-toenforce provisions as a way to punish noncompliance with difficult-to-enforce provisions.
Both varieties of indirect enforcement increase executive enforcement discretion and reduce
the expected benefit to firms of judicial involvement. Thus, if Argentine insurers had some
sense of the importance of Inciso K to Kirchner's ambitions for YPF in the Vaca Muerta,
perhaps they realized that a legal complaint against the regulation would be more trouble
than it was worth, especially given that they had to continue operating under an SSN with
ample enforcement discretion at its disposal.
Whether or not this was case, the model is better suited to suggest, rather than
demonstrate, as much. The simplicity of the objective functions (equations (iii) and (iv)) is
itself more of a virtue than a shortcoming of the model, because it focuses attention on how
the executive and judicial behavior affects the decisions of the other branch. While there are
surely other components of the Judiciary's reputation94 and sources of the Executive's
utility,95 the objective functions adopted here are meant to reflect only preferences over
levels of enforcement, compliance, and likelihood of affirmation. This parsimony makes the
model more effective as an analytical or conceptual tool than as a representation of reality
from which empirically falsifiable hypotheses can be deduced. In practice, the liberal dose of
assumptions sprinkled throughout its elaboration means that the model is unlikely to yield
many conclusions that were not baked into it from outset. While some assumptions merely
reduce complex phenomena to linear relationships, others posit institution-level motivations
that are likely not measurable in any meaningful sense other than by observing the outcomes
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 See generally, for example, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory
(Chicago 2015) (disaggregating the judiciary's reputation into individual and collective components, each
affected by a variety of audiences both internal and external to the judicial profession). See also Lawrence
Baum, Judges and Their Audiences 7 (Princeton 2006) ("[T]he strategic judge is subject to influence from a
variety of sources.").
95 Such as its popularity in domestic opinion polls or its relationships with other world leaders, for
example.
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they ostensibly cause. In these regards, the model falls victim to many of the most common
criticisms leveled against rational choice methodologies.96
IV. CONCLUSION
One way to think about strategic underenforcement is that it undermines respect for
the law as such. Whether by increasing the number of laws on the books without upping
enforcement efforts, or by decreasing enforcement efforts without reducing the number of
laws nominally in force, underenforcement signals to the governed that expectations of
obedience are not uniform across all laws. Some laws are meant to be complied with more
than others. But when this variation in expected compliance correlates strongly with an
executive's policy priorities, it becomes clear that the reason to comply with a law is not that
it is law, but rather that the executive expects compliance. To the extent that these distinct reasons
generate divergent compliance behaviors, respect for law becomes subordinated to respect
for executive authority.
Because the judiciary's power depends on a broad-based respect for law,
undermining that respect also undermines the judiciary's ability to affect behavior. While
Part II pointed to a rich body of scholarship elaborating this insight, Part III endeavored to
describe the conditions under which an executive can undermine judicial legitimacy by
strategically underenforcing its own regulatory provisions. When these conditions obtain, as
may well have been the case in Argentina from 2003 to 2015, a determined executive can
protect its prioritized policies from judicial review by reducing its level of enforcement,
further consolidating an already unbalanced concentration of power.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 See note 2.!
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APPENDIX A: First Order Conditions
The intersection of red lines in each quadrant of Figure 8 represents an equilibrium
outcome under direct enforcement, because neither the Executive nor the Judiciary has any
incentive to deviate from that point of intersection by altering its behavior.97 The lower red line in
each quadrant—intersecting the x-axis at either 0.4 (when the Executive cares more about the
future) or 0.55 (when the Executive cares more about the present)—represents the First Order
Condition (FOC) of the Executive's utility function, given in equation (iii). That is, it expresses
the relationship between λ and x that obtains when the Executive's utility is maximized. In
response to the changes in λ, the Executive will alter x as needed to stay on this curve. Likewise,
the upper red line in each quadrant represents the FOC of the Judiciary's objective function,
given in equation (iv). In response to changes in x, the Judiciary will alter λ as needed to stay on
this curve.
Comparing the functional forms of these FOCs to their forms under indirect
enforcement is a helpful way to build intuition about the dynamics of the model.
The Executive's FOC under direct enforcement is given by setting the first derivative of its utility
function equal to zero:

.
This implies that, under a direct enforcement regime, the Executive will try to set x such that

.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
There is no intersection depicted in the northwest quadrant of the figure, because when the Judiciary
cares more about its standing with the Executive than its standing among firms and the Executive cares
more about the present than about the future, it is optimal for the Executive to pursue full enforcement
even at relatively low levels of λ. Resultingly, the intersection of the optimal strategies occurs to the right
of the one-by-one square representing possible values of λ and x. The equilibrium outcome thus occurs at
full enforcement (x = 1), with the Judiciary ruling so as to signal that the likelihood it affirms a challenged
provision is just over one half (λ = 0.55).
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The same calculations yield a considerably more complex FOC for the Executive under an
indirect enforcement regime, given by:

.
Meanwhile, the Judiciary's optimal strategy under direct enforcement is given by:

.
And its optimal strategy under indirect enforcement is given by:

.
Intuitively, as enforcement (x) tends towards 1, a Judiciary that cares equally about its standing
with the Executive and among firms (i.e., β1!= β2) will tend to affirm challenged provisions half
the time. A Judiciary that cares more about the Executive's opinion than that of firms will be
more likely to affirm challenged provisions, with that effect magnified as the level of enforcement
decreases. The x-squared terms indicate that, under indirect enforcement, the effect of the
Judiciary's betas on its likelihood of affirmation is more strongly influenced by the level of
enforcement than it is under direct enforcement.
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APPENDIX B: Challenges to SSN Resolutions
Thomson Reuters manages a database of Argentine legislation and case law called
Información Legal. In order to estimate how many times resolutions issued by the SSN were
challenged in a given year, I conducted a separate search for each year since President Carlos
Menem took office, querying the database for all cases in which the SSN was a party. From
among the results, I removed duplicates, such that cases tried before multiple courts (on appeal,
for example) were counted as a single challenge. This method yielded an integer number cases per
year involving the SSN, approximating the number of times the SSN's resolutions are challenged
in court. To the extent that the SSN is hailed into court for reasons unrelated to its enforcement
of its resolutions, this approximation is likely to be an overestimate. However, to the extent that
challenges to the legitimacy of SSN resolutions are settled out of court before a final ruling is
handed down, to the extent that some challenges to SSN resolutions are not archived by
Información Legal or do not directly implicate the SSN as a defendant, and to the extent that a given
ruling may be the result of many challenges to one or more resolutions, this approximation is
likely to be an underestimate. Without further investigation into the intricacies of Argentine
administrative procedure, it would be difficult to say anything more specific about the accuracy of
the number of challenges identified using this method. Accurate or inaccurate as it may be, a
complete list of the court cases identified is appended below; there seems to have been no court
cases involving the SSN decided in 1989, 1991, 1992, 2013, 2014, or 2015.
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Publicado en:
Sumario: En ejercicio de la sana crítica y contemplando una interpretación teleológica del art. 87 de la ley 20.091
(Adla, XXXIII-A, 150), resulta adecuado que la publicación en el Boletín Oficial de la sanción impuesta por la
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siempre y en todos los casos la competencia de los jueces en lo contenciosoadministrativo. Así, por ejemplo, cuando la
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Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Sumario: Es competente la justicia federal en lo contencioso administrativo para tramitar la demanda interpuesta
contra el Estado Nacional por violación de los deberes de policía que le competen respecto de las empresas
aseguradoras y que ejerce por medio de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, pues está en juego la función
administrativa en sí del órgano estatal y la responsabilidad extracontractual del Estado, con lo cual la materia excede el
marco propio de aplicación de la ley 20.091 y puede ser encuadrada en el art. 45, inc. a), de la ley 13.998. (Del
dictamen del Procurador General que la Corte hace suyo)
Voces: PODER DE POLICIA ~ RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO ~ ASEGURADOR ~ SEGURO ~
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SEGUROS DE LA NACION ~ COMPETENCIA FEDERAL ~ DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS
~ RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACONTRACTUAL ~ COMPETENCIA
Hechos
Una persona promovió demanda contra el Estado Nacional, imputándole responsabilidad por violación de los
deberes de policía que le competen respecto de las empresas aseguradoras y que ejerce por medio de la
Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación. Dos jueces federales se declararon incompetentes. La Corte
Suprema dispone que la causa tramite en el fuero con competencia en lo contencioso administrativo federal.
4.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 23/02/1993
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación s/ infracción tarifaria de Sud América Terrestre y Marítima.
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Partes: Ripa Alsina, Pablo G. c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
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Sumario: Si se ha entablado una demanda contra el Estado nacional por violación de los deberes de policía que le
competen respecto de las empresas aseguradoras y que ejerce por medio de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la
Nación, se halla en juego la función administrativa del órgano estatal y, por ende, la responsabilidad extracontractual
del Estado, materia que excede el marco propio de aplicación de la ley 20.091 y, consecuentemente, la competencia
atribuida por el art. 83, parte 1ª al fuero en lo comercial, debiéndose encuadrar la acción en las causas contencioso
administrativa del art. 45, inc. a), de la ley 13.998 (Adla, XXXIII-A, 150; X-A, 221).
Voces: COMPETENCIA EN LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO ~ ESTADO NACIONAL ~
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Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Sumario: Al dirigirse la demanda contra la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación —ente autárquico del Estado
Nacional, que ejerce la función de policía respecto de las empresas aseguradoras—, corresponde la competencia de la
justicia contencioso administrativa federal, pues, se halla en juego la función administrativa de un órgano estatal y por
ende la responsabilidad extracontractual del Estado, lo que excede el marco propio de aplicación de la ley 20.091 y
consecuentemente la competencia atribuida al fuero comercial por su artículo 83 —primera parte—, exclusivamente
respecto de resoluciones definitivas de carácter particular, ello es así, en especial porque se objeta en el caso el obrar
del órgano y se reclama en virtud de su efecto supuestamente dañoso. (Del Dictamen del Procurador General que la
Corte hace suyo)
Voces: COMPETENCIA EN LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO ~ ENTIDAD AUTARQUICA ~ PODER DE
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CUESTION DE COMPETENCIA ~ CUESTION NEGATIVA DE COMPETENCIA ~ DETERMINACION DE LA
COMPETENCIA ~ FUERO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO ~ SUPERINTENDENCIA
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En el marco de una demanda contra la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación se produjo una cuestión
negativa de competencia entre la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal y un
juzgado nacional de primera instancia en lo comercial. La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación declaró la
competencia de la justicia contencioso administrativo federal en razón de la persona.
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Publicado en: LA LEY1999-C, 422 - DJ1999-2, 624
Cita Online: AR/JUR/1231/1998
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala IV
Fecha: 17/11/1998
Título:
Partes: Gallardo, Hugo H. v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 1/53092
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 19/06/1998
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Cumbre Coop. de Seguros Ltda.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35020531
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 12/06/1998
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35020532
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 21/04/1998
Título:
Partes: Atlántica Cía. Americana de seguros c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación.
Publicado en: LA LEY1998-D, 540 - DJ1998-2, 1223
Cita Online: AR/JUR/964/1998
Documento: Texto Completo
6.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 02/04/1998
Título:
Partes: Atlántica Compañía Americana de Seguros v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
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Cita Online: 1/48497
Documento: Texto Completo
7.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 12/03/1998
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación s/asunto J. C. Sanucci y Cía.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 1/42933
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 17/11/1999
Título: Entidades de seguro - Control - Publicación de la revocación de la autorización para operar
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Mercosur Compañía Americana de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 30000883
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 29/10/1999
Título: Ejercicio anormal de la actividad - "Error" en la cotización previa - Perjuicio
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Previnter Compañía Argentina de Seguros de Retiro S.A.
Publicado en: JA 2000-IV-793;
Cita Online: 20003663
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala IV
Fecha: 12/08/1999
Título:
Partes: Santa María, Armando J. y otros v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 1/49772
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 04/06/1999
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Juncal Cía. de seguros.
Publicado en: LA LEY2000-A, 495 - DJ2000-1, 274
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4413/1999
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, sala C
Fecha: 25/02/1999
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Santoro, Nicolás F.
Publicado en: LA LEY1999-F, 417
Cita Online: AR/JUR/2954/1999
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V
Fecha: 14/07/2000
Título:
Partes: Eagle Star (International Life) Limited -Suc. Argentina- c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación.
Publicado en: LA LEY 2000-F , 837, con nota de Juan Carlos Cassagne ; DJ2001-2, 404
Cita Online: AR/JUR/3077/2000
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala II
Fecha: 01/06/2000
Título: Poder de policía - Responsabilidad de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Funcionamiento del
mercado asegurador
Partes: Compañía de Transportes Río de la Plata S.A. v. Estado Nacional
Publicado en: JA 2000-IV-782;
Cita Online: 20004630
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata
Fecha: 02/03/2000
Título:
Partes: Sorba, Luis E. y otros c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro
Publicado en: LLBA 2000 , 826, con nota de Rubén Stiglitz y María Fabiana Compiani; RCyS 2000 , 339, con nota
de Rubén Stiglitz; María Fabiana Compiani; DJ2000-3, 827
Cita Online: AR/JUR/1026/2000
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala IV
Fecha: 15/02/2000
Título: Derecho a la jurisdicción - Ley de seguros - Prórroga de jurisdicción - Inconstitucionalidad
Partes: Mutual de Residentes del Barrio Tais de la ciudad de El Trébol y otros v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la
Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 30002868
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 04/02/2000
Título: Productores asesores de seguros - Concertación habitual de mutuos - Cancelación de la inscripción
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación -J. H. Hartford Seguros de Retiro, Segpool S.A. y o Segpoo
Publicado en: JA 2001-IV-787;
Cita Online: 20014009
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 03/10/2001
Título: Entidades aseguradoras - Intervención judicial
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. India Compañía Argentina de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 30000346
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Provincia de Santa Fe
Fecha: 11/07/2001
Título:
Partes: Rolle, Edgardo B. s/incidente de regulación de honorarios en: El Acuerdo Compañía de Seguros S.A. c.
Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: LLLitoral 01/01/1900, 411
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4451/2001
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 11/09/2002
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Cruz Suiza Cía. de Seguros
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 1/68312
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 08/08/2002
Título: Requisitos propios - Cuestiones no federales - Sentencias arbitrarias - Procedencia del recurso - Defectos en la
consideración de extremos conducentes
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Inca S.A. Cía. de Seguros s/recurso extraordinario
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 4/46913
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 13/06/2002
Título: Entidades aseguradoras - Revocación de la autorización para funcionar - Cheque de pago diferido - Obligación
exigible - Plan de regularización y saneamiento
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Suizo Argentina Compañía de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 30002842
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 27/11/2003
Título: Entidad de seguros - Robo de libros - Omisión de denuncia - Sanciones
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Los Ángeles Brokers S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70010000
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 14/11/2003
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: LA LEY13/01/2004, 3
Cita Online: AR/JUR/3225/2003
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 24/04/2003
Título: Requisitos propios - Cuestiones no federales - Interpretación de normas locales de procedimientos - Casos
varios
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. ITT Hartford Seguros de Retiros S.A. y otros
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 4/47840
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 14/12/2004
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. R., E. J.
Publicado en: LA LEY17/02/2005, 8
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4159/2004
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 15/10/2004
Título: Rescate de valores - Pago con bonos
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Nationale Nederlanden Cía. de Seguros de Vida
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35001054
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala II
Fecha: 12/10/2004
Título:
Partes: Linares, Hugo N. y otro c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro
Publicado en: LA LEY10/02/2005, 8
Cita Online: AR/JUR/3940/2004
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 24/06/2004
Título: Requisitos propios - Cuestiones no federales - Sentencias arbitrarias - Procedencia del recurso - Excesos u
omisiones en el pronunciamiento
Partes: Sorba, Luis E. y otros v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro s/daños y perjuicios sumario
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 4/52351
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 27/05/2004
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Lua Seguros La Porteña S.A.
Publicado en: DJ2004-3, 742 - LA LEY06/01/2005, 3
Cita Online: AR/JUR/2420/2004
Documento: Texto Completo
6.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 30/03/2004
Título: Contencioso administrativo - Resolución de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Competencia
territorial
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Partes: Mutual de Residentes del Barrio de Tais de la ciudad de El Trébol v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la
Nación
Publicado en: JA 2004-II-80;
Cita Online: 20041721
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 22/12/2005
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Rubino, Eugenio E.
Publicado en: DJ21/06/2006, 586
Cita Online: AR/JUR/8286/2005
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V
Fecha: 05/12/2005
Título: Resolución conjunta 39/1998 y 25806/1998 de la Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo y de la
Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Inconstitucionalidad
Partes: La Buenos Aires Compañía Argentina de Seguros S.A. v. Superintendencia Seguros Nación y otro
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35021348
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 21/11/2005
Título: Entidad de seguro - Control - Facultades - Intervención en cuestiones surgidas del contrato de seguro Cumplimiento de la cláusula de arbitraje
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Río Uruguay Coop. De seguros Ltda.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70023712
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 18/10/2005
Título: Régimen disciplinario - Uso de expresión equívoca en la documentación
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. El Progreso y otros
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35002940
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 04/10/2005
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Provida S.R.L. y otros
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/5414/2005
Documento: Texto Completo
6.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 14/09/2005
Título: Entidades de seguro - Registración contable - Registros pendiente
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Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Alba Cía. Argentina de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70021427
Documento: Texto Completo
7.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala IV
Fecha: 09/08/2005
Título: Productor asesor de seguros - Deber de presentación de sus libros - Intimación - Notificación en domicilio
distinto del constituido - Inhabilitación
Partes: Caligiuri, Pedro s/resolución 29792/2004 "Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación"
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35002473
Documento: Texto Completo
8.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 05/08/2005
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Mora, Guillermo
Publicado en: DJ2005-3, 1181 - RCyS2006-II, 91
Cita Online: AR/JUR/3721/2005
Documento: Texto Completo
9.
Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata
Fecha: 12/05/2005
Título: Autoridad de control - Superintendencia de Seguros - Funciones - Control de la relación entre asegurado y
aseguradora - Incumplimiento - Efectos
Partes: Sorba, Luis E. v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro
Publicado en: LNBA 2006-1-43;
Cita Online: 35001741
Documento: Texto Completo
10.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala III
Fecha: 23/03/2005
Título: Agente de Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Calificación de su actuación - Impugnación del acto
administrativo - Amparo
Partes: Martínez, Hernán D. v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35001862
Documento: Texto Completo
11.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 23/03/2005
Título: Resolución de la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Abstención de publicar resolución de carácter
particular
Partes: Reisman, Jorge D. y otros v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70034781
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 14/11/2006
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Carbone, Marta Susana
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/10951/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala II
Fecha: 15/08/2006
Título: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Liquidación judicial de aseguradora - Incumplimiento de la
cobertura pactada - Prescripción - Cómputo
Partes: Sequeira, Juan F. y otro v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35004052
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 12/06/2006
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Jue, Claudio A.
Publicado en: RCyS2006, 1369
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4027/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 28/03/2006
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Sánchez, Roberto Jorge
Publicado en: DJ27/09/2006, 299
Cita Online: AR/JUR/1630/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala III
Fecha: 06/03/2006
Título:
Partes: Kovachs, Claudia Beatriz c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otro
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4701/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
6.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 20/02/2006
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Santilli, Carlos H.
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Publicado en: RCyS2006, 1362
Cita Online: AR/JUR/704/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
7.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 20/02/2006
Título: Productor asesor de seguro - Responsabilidad - Certificado de cobertura
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Santilli, Carlos H.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70023694
Documento: Texto Completo
8.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 07/02/2006
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Agrosalta Coop. de Seg. Ltda.
Publicado en: LA LEY 14/06/2006, 10 - LA LEY2006-C, 863
Cita Online: AR/JUR/445/2006
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 28/08/2007
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Rodríguez, Laura Natalia
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/9615/2007
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 28/08/2007
Título:
Partes: Liberty A.R.T. S.A. c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/8806/2007
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 27/03/2007
Título: Domicilio del asegurado - Fecha de vencimiento - Entrega de la póliza - Productor asesor - Acto
administrativo - Nulidad - Procedimiento administrativo
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Liderar Compañía General de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 35022236
Documento: Texto Completo
© Thomson Reuters Información Legal

1 of 1

1

9/24/16, 9:40 AM

https://informacionlegal.com.ar/maf/app/delivery/offload/get?_...

Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 20/11/2008
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Asunto Adriana Graciela Albornoz
Cita Online: AR/JUR/22632/2008
Publicado en: DJ20/05/2009, 1349
Sumario: Corresponde confirmar la resolución por la cual la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación impuso una
sanción de inhabilitación a un productor de seguros que omitió informar al asegurado la obligación que asumía de
instalar un dispositivo de recuperación vehicular, no entregó copia del contrato respectivo, emitió una constancia de
emisión de póliza en trámite, a pesar de no encontrarse facultada para ello, y facilitó la utilización de su matrícula a
personas no inscriptas en el registro correspondiente, pues tales conductas infringieron los arts. 10 inc. 1 apartado i, 12
y 15 de la ley 22.400.
Voces: INHABILITACION PROFESIONAL ~ PRODUCTOR DE SEGUROS ~ SEGURO ~ SUPERINTENDENCIA
DE SEGUROS DE LA NACION
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala III
Fecha: 18/11/2008
Partes: Ruiz, José M. v. Estado Nacional -Superintendencia de Seguros de la NaciónCita Online: 70050155
Publicado en:
Sumario: Debe confirmarse la sanción de inhabilitación impuesta por la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación a
un productor asesor de seguros por haber cooperado con personas no inscriptas en el Registro de Productores Asesores
de Seguros en el ejercicio de la actividad de intermediación de seguros infringiendo los arts. 10 , 12 y 15 , ley 22400,
dado que el sancionado reconoció que con él colaboró una persona que no se encontraba autorizada para intermediar
en la concertación de seguros, y que por ende, incumplió las funciones establecidas, sin que pueda ser exculpado bajo
la teoría del mandato.
Voces: Poder de policía ~ En particular ~ De los servicios
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 16/10/2008
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Carelli, Marcelo Mariano
Cita Online: AR/JUR/15469/2008
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Sumario: Tratándose del incumplimiento a un deber formal por un productor de seguros, como es la falta de
comparencia sin los registros de uso obligatorio, sin que pueda verificarse la concurrencia de un daño concreto que le
sea imputable, corresponde modificar el tipo de sanción, dejar sin efecto la inhabilitación y reducirla a un llamado de
atención.
Voces: SANCION ~ AUXILIAR DE SEGUROS ~ PRODUCTOR DE SEGUROS ~ SEGURO
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala V
Fecha: 20/05/2008
Partes: Villanueva Baya, Gabriel E. v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, resolución 32055/2007
Cita Online: 70045687
Sumario: Si la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación aplicó a un productor de seguros la sanción de inhabilitación
por 5 años por violación al punto 10.1 , resolución SSN 24828 y a los arts. 10, incs. 1 y 12 , ley 22400 y el art. 55 , ley
20091 a través de incumplimientos relativos a los deberes de gestión, asesoramiento y registración atinentes, no es una
justificación válida de la demora en la liquidación de las cuotas percibidas a la compañía aseguradora la referencia del
sancionado a un convenio tácito con ésta respecto a las fechas y formas de liquidación y rendición de su gestión, en la
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medida que este plazo que pudiera haberse convenido no podría exceder el fijado por la reglamentación.
Voces: Seguridad social ~ Previsión social (Régimen leyes 18037 y 18038) ~ Trabajadores en relación de dependencia
~ Subsidio por sepelio
5.
Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Rosario, sala B
Fecha: 26/03/2008
Partes: Vitale, Nicolás c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Cita Online: AR/JUR/964/2008
Publicado en: RCyS2008, 890 - LLLitoral 01/01/1900, 572
Sumario: En una acción de daños y perjuicios incoada, contra la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación, por la
frustración del derecho del actor a percibir la indemnización fijada en una sentencia firme, como consecuencia del
estado de liquidación de la aseguradora que debía afrontar dicho resarcimiento, resulta competente el juez del lugar
donde tiene su sede la aseguradora liquidada pues, allí es donde la entidad demandada no habría ejercido
correctamente sus facultades de fiscalización, aún cuando la sede de ésta se encuentre en la Capital Federal.
Voces: RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO ~ LIQUIDACION DE ENTIDADES ASEGURADORAS ~ SEGURO
~ SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SEGUROS DE LA NACION ~ DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS ~ COMPETENCIA ~
COMPETENCIA EN RAZON DEL TERRITORIO
Hechos
Una persona que había visto frustrado su derecho a percibir la indemnización fijada a su favor en una sentencia
firme, en virtud de la liquidación de la aseguradora condenada, interpuso una demanda de daños y perjuicios
contra la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación por considerar que la frustración de su derecho era
consecuencia del defectuoso ejercicio de las facultades de fiscalización de dicho órgano. El juez de primera
instancia declaró la incompetencia del Juzgado Federal con asiento en la sede de la aseguradora liquidada. La
Cámara revocó el fallo apelado, y declaró la competencia del referido juzgado.
6.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala III
Fecha: 25/02/2008
Partes: Serra, Jorge E. y otro v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Cita Online: 70043802
Sumario: Si la Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación aplicó a un productor la sanción de inhabilitación por 5 años
por incumplimientos relativos al uso obligatorio de libro de registros exigido por el art. 10, inc. 1 , ley 22400, deben
rechazarse los agravios en que se sustenta la impugnación deducida que se centran en que finalmente el sumariado
luego de pedir prórroga presentó los libros en hojas rubricadas en los que se vuelcan gran parte de las operaciones,
dado que la obligación de llevar el libro es de carácter permanente, razón por la cual no resulta causal de exculpación
válida la circunstancia de que con posterioridad a la intimación se hubiese saneado la situación, encontrándose
evidentemente configurada la infracción.
Voces: Poder de policía ~ En particular ~ De las actividades financieras
7.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 19/02/2008
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. Agrosalta Coop. de seguros Ltda.
Cita Online: 4/66547
Publicado en:
Sumario: El recurso extraordinario contra la sentencia que dejó sin efecto la revocación para operar en seguros es
inadmisible (art. 280 , CPCCN.).
Voces: Cuestiones federales simples ~ Cuestión federal ~ Interpretación de las leyes federales ~ Leyes federales en
general ~ Principios generales ~ RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO ~ Requisitos propios ~ SEGURO ~
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SEGUROS DE LA NACIÓN
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 06/10/2009
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Serca S.R.L. y otros
Publicado en:
Cita Online: AR/JUR/46183/2009
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 11/09/2009
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Agrosalta Coop de Seg. Ltda.
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/44291/2009
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 26/11/2010
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Prudencia Compañía Argentina de Seguros Gral. S.A.
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/88432/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 26/11/2010
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Chiavarino, Juan Angel
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/88429/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala II
Fecha: 17/11/2010
Título:
Partes: El Acuerdo Cia Argentina de Seguros SA c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otros
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/89808/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 21/09/2010
Título: Notificación de la sentencia definitiva en el domicilio constituido - Validez - Recurso extraordinario Interposición extemporánea
Partes: Ledesma, Martha S. y otro v. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y Estado Nacional
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70066368
Documento: Texto Completo
5.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala C
Fecha: 11/06/2010
Título:
Partes: La Economía Comercial S.A. de Seguros Generales s/pedido de quiebra (Superintendencia de Seguros de la
Nación)
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/39252/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
6.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala II
Fecha: 08/06/2010
Título: Responsabilidad del Estado - Actuación de la Superintendencia de Seguros - Medidas de rescate
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Partes: Navarro, Sergio A. v. Estado Nacional - Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en:
Cita Online: 70064997
Documento: Texto Completo
7.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 18/05/2010
Título:
Partes: Abraham e Hijo S.R.L. c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/29235/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
8.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 13/04/2010
Título:
Partes: Protección Mutual de Seguros del Transporte Público de Pasajeros y otros c. Estado Nacional Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/11542/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
9.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D
Fecha: 26/02/2010
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de seguros de La Nación c. Assurant Argentina Compañia de Seguros S.A.
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4868/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
10.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 23/02/2010
Título:
Partes: Asociación Trabajadores del Estado c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/9514/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
11.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 18/02/2010
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de seguros de la Nacion c. Tracogna, Fernando Mario
Publicado en:
Cita Online: AR/JUR/4614/2010
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A
Fecha: 04/08/2011
Título:
Partes: Acosta, Beatriz Griselda y Garcia, Rocio Veronica c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación - Ministerio
de Economía y Finanzas Públicas de la Nación s/ amparo
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/62240/2011
Documento: Texto Completo
2.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala IV
Fecha: 17/05/2011
Título:
Partes: Allende, Santiago c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación s/despido
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/26998/2011
Documento: Texto Completo
3.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B
Fecha: 29/03/2011
Título:
Partes: Romero, Héctor Ariel c. Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación y otros
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/14649/2011
Documento: Texto Completo
4.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E
Fecha: 14/03/2011
Título:
Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación c. Marconi, Marisa Ethel -Productora Asesora de Seguros
Publicado en: La Ley Online;
Cita Online: AR/JUR/15185/2011
Documento: Texto Completo
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Lista de Resultados

1.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
Fecha: 02/10/2012
Título: Reglamento General de la Actividad Aseguradora – Auditor externo – Sanción – Impugnación – Plazos de
prescripción – Actos interruptivos – Recurso extraordinario – Arbitrariedad de sentencia Partes: Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación v. La Economía Comercial SA de Seguros Generales
Publicado en: RDA 2013-86-489;
Cita Online: AP/JUR/3959/2012
Documento: Texto Completo
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